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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, concluded that the
case of United States v. Classic' 6 was relevant since it held that Con-
gress was authorized to regulate primary elections ". . where the
primary is by law made an integral part of the election ma-
chinery. .... .,17
The Court found state action present when thi party, under
statutory authority, conducted the primary election.'8 That the Court
thought a state should not encourage any discriminatory activity was
quite evident.19
The majority opinion conceded that the instant clse presented a
* . substantially similar factual situation. . ." as that found in the
Grovey case.20 Yet it maintained that " ...when convinced of former
error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." 21 It
seems reasonable to say that the Court was quite aware of its action,
and that it forcefully meant what it was deciding.
It is submitted that the decision in the principal case is sound.
The plain words of the United States Constitution aad their literal
and unmistakable meaning,22 could not easily dictate any other result.
CRIMINAL LAW
PRESENCE OF ACCUSED DURING REREADING
OF THE INSTRUCTIONS
After the jury had deliberated five or six hours over its verdict
on a rape charge, the judge, proposing to reread the instructions, called
16. 313 U. S. 299 (1941), cited supra note 5.
17. Id. at 318. The Classic decision was considered pertinent only
". .. because the recognition of the place of the primary in the
electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of
the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delega-
tion of a state function that may make the party~s action the ac-
tion of the State." Instant case at 660.
18. Instant case at 663. It was found that certain committees of the
party or its state convention would certify the party's candidates to
be included on the official ballot for the ensuing i'eneral election.
A name not so certified could not appear on thaIt ballot. This
statutory method of selection of party nominees recquired the party
which adhered to these directions to be ". . . an agency of the
State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary
election." Ibid. The Court said further that "the party takes its
character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by
state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law
because they are performed by a political party." Ibid.
19. "If the State requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a
general election ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and
limits the choice of the electorate in general elections for state
officers, practically speaking, to those whose nanes appear on
such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination
against Negroes, practiced by a party entrusted by Texas law
with the determination of the qualifications of participants in the
primary. This is state action within the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment." Id. at 664.
20. Instant case at 661.
21. Id. at 665.
22. See note 1 supra.
19451
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the appellant's attorney to the courtroom and asked if he desired that
appellant be brought from the jail to the courtroom so as to be present
when the instructions were again read. The attorney expressly waived
appellant's presence, whereupon the judge read to the jury for the
second time all the written instructions; then he once more directed the
jury to retire and attempt to agree upon a verdict. Held, reversed and
motion for new trial sustained. There was no showing that appellant
authorized such waiver by his attorney. In overruling the case of
Ray v. State,1 the court stated, in regard to the statute requiring the
presence of accused during trial,2 that the appellant's presence could
be waived but only by his express authorization. Miles v. State-Ind.
53 N.E. (2d) 779 (1944).
The state statutes requiring the presence of the accused during
trial of a felony are mere declarations of the common law.3
It is generally recognized that a prisoner has the "right ' 4 to be
present during all stages of his trial for a felony.5 There is direct con-
flict among the authorities as to whether one accused of a felony can
waive his "right" to be present at the trial or at any part of the
trial.6 The majority view seems to be that one accused of a felony
can waive his "right" to be present at any stage of the trial.7
In Indiana, the question arises as to whether the statute,8 which
requires the presence of the accused at the trial, is mandatory at every
step of the trial or whether it can be waived, and if so, in what manner.
In Hopt v. United States,9 the United States Supreme Court interpreted
1. 207 Ind. 370, 192 N.E. 751 (1934).
2. Acts 1905, c. 169, Sec. 222, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1942 Replace-
ment) Sec. 9-1801. "No person prosecuted for any offense punish-
able by death or confinement in the state prison or county jail
shall be tried unless personally present during trial."
3. Frank v. Mangrum, 237 U.S. 309 (1914); Lewis v. United States,
216 U.S. 611 (1914); Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 189; Ewbank,
"Criminal Law" (2d ed. 1929) Sec. 445.
4. We must realize that this is not referring to a "right" in the
strict contract sense, as it is commonly held that one can not
waive such a "right." Willis, "Promissory and Non-Promissory
Conditions" (1941) 16 Ind. L. J. 349, 366. Using the word "right"
in this sense carries the interpretation of being a privilege; other-
wise, it could not be waived. Several states have allowed waivers
of such a "right." See, Lowman v. State, 80 Fla. 18, 85 So. 166(1920); Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 83 S.E. 645 (1914); State v.
Bragdon, 136 Minn. 348, 162 N.W. 465 (1917); State v. O'Neal, 197
N.C. 548, 149 S.E. (2d) 968 (1934); People v. La Barbera, 274
N.Y. 339, 8 N.E. (2d) 884 (1937).
5. State v. Wilson, 50 Ind. 487 (1875). In Indiana this is a statutory
right: See note 2 Supra.
6. 8 R. C. L., Criminal Law, Sec. 53; 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law,
Sec. 199.
7. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); State v. Way, 76 Kan.
928, 93 Pac. 159 (1907); Thomas v. State, 117 Miss. 532, 78 So.
147 (1918).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
a statute 0 similar to the one in question to mean in substance that it
was essential to the protection of one whose life or liberty was in-
volved in a prosecution for a felony that he should be l ersonally pres-
ent at the trial, that is, at every stage of the trial when his sub-
stantial rights might be affected by the proceedings against him.1
It is questionable whether rereading the same instructions is such a
substantial right.12 In the case of Ray v. State,13 the Supreme Court
of Indiana held that the statute concerned is mandato Ly in favor of
the prisoner when it appears that any substantial part of the trial is
had in his absence and without his consent. However, the principal
case expressly overrules this case thereby leaving it possible for a
defendant to waive his presence at a substantial part of his trial.
It seems that the principal purpose of requiring the accused to be
present at the trial of a felony was to protect his "right" of due
process of law.14 If this be so, then it would seem justifiable that the
accused should be allowed to expressly waive such a "right." "He can
waive a trial altogether, and plead guilty. He can waive the constitu-
tional and legal privilege of trial by jury. He can waive the . . .
privilege of being a second time put in jeopardy."' 15 Then logically why
should he not be permitted to waive his privilege of beirg present at a
substantial part of the trial?
Next there arises the question as to the manner of waiving the
presence of the accused. The voluntary absence of accused during a
trial waives his "right" of being present.10 This certainly is not an
express waiver but an implied one. If we can imply a -waiver from the
voluntary absence of accused, then can we also imply that his attorney
can waive his presence during the rereading of instructions to the
10. This statute (Code of Criminal Procedure of Utah, Sec. 218) pro-
vided that, "If the indictment is for a felony, the defendant must
be personally present at the trial. . . ." Id. at 576.
11. The court went on to say that if he had been deprived of his life
or liberty without being so present, such deprivation would be with-
out the due process of law required by the constiution. Id. at 579.
12. The settlement of instructions is not a part of the trial necessitat-
ing the presence of accused at the trial of a felony. State v. Hall,
55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918). It was not error for the judge
in the absence of the defendant to urge the jury to agree after it
had deliberated for twenty hours. Sevilla v. People, 65 Colo. 437,
177 Pac. 135 (1918).
13. 207 Ind. 370, 192 N.E. 751 (1934), cited supra note 1.
14. Hopt. v. People of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); People v. MeGrane,
336 Ill. 404, 168 N.E. 321 (1929); State v. Blackwelder, 61 N.C.
51 (1886); Andrews v. State, 34 Tenn. 550 (1885). The Indiana
Supreme Court has said, "The constitution and laws provide that
a defendant in a criminal case shall be present at his trial. This
is for a two-fold object-1. That the defendant may have the op-
portunity of meeting the witnesses and jury face to face, and of
directing the course of his trial. 2. That the state may be in pos-
session of his person so that judgment may be executed thereon."
McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind: 39, 44, 45 (1859).
15. McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39, 45 (1859).
16. Southerland v. State, 176 Ind. 493, 96 N.E. 583 (1911); State v.
Smith, 183 Wash. 136, 48 P. (2d) 581 (1935); McCorkle v. State, 14
Ind. 39 (1859); State v. Wamire, 16 Ind. 357 (1816).
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jury? The majority of states hold that in the physical absence of
the defendant, his counsel cannot waive his "right" to be present.17
One state has clear-cut decisions holding the exact opposite: that is,
an attorney may waive a defendant's presence.' 8 However, the prevail-
ing view seems to be that the defendant must expressly relinquish a
"right" before he can be understood to waive it and no presumption
will be made in favor of a waiver.19 Indiana follows this latter rule in
the case at hand by refusing to accept a waiver of the accused's pres-
ence without his express consent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
INSURANCE DECLARED INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Nearly 200 private stock fire insurance companies formed a com-
bination, operating in six southern states, to fix agents' commissions
and to fix non-competitive premium rates, to be effected by boycotts
against persons purchasing insurance from non-members, by refusing
to allow agents representing non-member insurance companies to
represent them, and refusing the opportunity of re-insurance to non-
member companies. Members of the association were indicted for
alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' The District Court
dismissed the indictment.2 The Supreme Court, in reversing this ac-
tion held that "fire insurance transactions which stretch across state
lines constitute 'commerce among the several state'." United States
v. South Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
In Paul v. Virginia,s the Supreme Court announced that "the
business of insurance is not commerce," 4 and in the intervening years
17. Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325 (1865); Stroope v. State, 72 Ark. 379,
80 S.W. 749 (1904); Bonner v. State, 67 Ga. 510 (1881); State v.
Wilcoxen, 200 Iowa 1250, 206 N.W. 260 (1925); State v. Myrick,
38 Kan. 238, 16 Pac. 330 (1888); State v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St.
87, 19 N.E. (2d) 645 (1939); Schafer v. State, 118 Texas Cr. R.
500, 40 S.W. (2d) 147 (1931).
18. In Davidson v. State, 108 Ark. 191, 195, 158 S.W. 1103, 1107(1913) the court said, "It is not essential to a valid waiver that
defendant should make the agreement in his own person. He may
do so through his own counsel, and, as before stated, in the ab-
sence of a showing to the contrary, authority to perform an act
in the progress of the trial, which counsel assume to do, will
be presumed." Accord, Nelson v. State, 190 Ark. 1027, 82 S.W. (2d)
619 (1935); Durham v. State, 179 Ark. 507, 16 S.W. (2d) 991(1929); Schruggs v. State, 131 Ark. 320, 198 S.W. 694 (1917).
19. Biggs v. Lloyd, 70 Cal. 447 (1886); Commonwealth v. Andrews,
3 Mass. 126 (1807); French v. State, 85 Wis. 400, 55 N.W. 566
(1893).
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-2.
2. 51 F. Supp. 712 (194 ) See Legis. Note (1943) 32 Geo. L. J. 66.
3. 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168 (1869).
4. See also, Liverpool and L. Life and F. Ins. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 10 Wall. (U.S.) 566, (1870); Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, (1894). Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiscon-
sin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
For a general collection of cases, see Gavit, The Commerce Clause
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